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within the DoD about whether federated systems are aAbstract - Acoustic Rapid COTS Insertion (A-RCI) is a soun approachafor w hting systems apid
success story in the use of Modular Open Systems COTS Insertion progressed at a seemingly crushing pace,
Approach (MOSd-a soperon Subeinningnd with software changes being implemented annually and
hardware changes biannually. A-RCI was, therefore, alater encompassing all sonar systems on all attack 4
"poster child" for evolutionary acquisition. The results of
submarines, some surface ship sonar applications and A-RCI were astounding cost reduction, dramatic
even aviation anti-submarine warfare. The DoD has long
considered Open Systems Design a "best practice" that iOvem en int al prformance, succssu ueof
ais COTS hardware in a critical warfighting application,should be used during system development. However, logistics support improvements, and an acquisition model
often the case with best practices, the "lessons learned"
. X l X . .o'
have not been trumpeted widely across DoD acquisition
organizations. The purpose of this A-RCI case study is to
create a learning vehicle for the application ofMOSAIOA 2 Scope and Methodology
which then could be usedfor the training and education of
acquisition practitioners andfuture acquisition leaders. 2.1 Expert Interviews
The scope of this research effort included two
Keywords: Advanced Processing Builds (APB), Modular elements. The first was to interview key participants in A-
Open Systems Approach (MOSA), Open Architecture RCI and to gain their perspectives on key contributors to
(OA), System Lifecycle Cost (LCC), Spiral Acquisition, the success of A-RCI. The second element included
Maintenance Free Operating Period (MFOP), Total literature research related to acquisition processes and
Ownership Cost (TOC). practices, modular open systems approach (MOSA)/open
1 Background architecture (OA), and written documentation related to A-
RCI.
In the mid- 1990s, the submarine community
recognized the impending loss of US technical superiority 2.2 Literature Research
in submarine acoustics when foreign submarines began to
exhibit major reduction in noise signature. This resulted in Published information was used to document A-RCI
a critical need to improve acoustic sensing systems to outcomes, gain additional information on A-RCI/APB
better recognize foreign submarines. Although new techniques and processes, and also to provide comparative
capability was critically needed, required resources were background information. There is a body of mandatory and
not available to support the developmental effort. Critical discretionary guidance published by the Office of the
need and the absence of sufficient funding constituted a Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
crisis-demanding a revolutionary approach to achieve Staff and by the DoD Components. Much of this material is
necessary technological improvement. on the AT&L Knowledge Sharing System website
maintained by the Defense Acquisition University for the
The approach came to be called A-RCI Acoustic Under Secretary of Defense (AT&L). Defense acquisition
Rapid COTS Insertion. A-RCI took an integrated acoustic policy and processes are addressed in the DoD 5000 series.
system that was difficult and time-consuming to change
and converted it into a federated system that could be Other published materials include books, journals,
upgraded in modules that is, "plug and play." Such an periodicals, Government documents, reports, best practices,
approach~~~wa comni.h rvt etri h 90 theses, studies, speeches and briefings. Much has been
and even before. Although the idea wasn't new, the written on federated systems, A-RCI, MOSA, and spiral
application of this approach to an existing warfighting acquisition. The Defense Acquisition University has
system was daunting. Even today, there are arguments developed and compiled educational materials on spiral
1-4244-1 160-2/07/$25.OO ©2007 IEEE.
development and MOSA best practices and has placed operational community accept operational limitations while
significant information online. In addition to the DAU the system was being modularized.
websites, there are other significant materials that are web
accessible, including the Open Systems Joint Task Force A-RCI's pursuance of modularity led to separation of
website [1]. Finally, considerable associated work has been hardware and software for purposes of system
commissioned by the Program Manager, Naval Open improvement. In this way, processors (the hardware) could
Architecture, Program Executive Office for Integrated be commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) and could be
Warfare Systems (PEO IWS). upgraded in consonance with the evolving commercial
market. The application software could be developed
3 Data and Analysis separately from the processors as long as the two wouldinteroperate through use of transportable middleware. The
3.1 The Crisis transportable middleware provided freedom to run
it application software on different processors. All this wasAs mentioned earlier, during the mid-1990s, ic made possible through the control of key interfaces.
became apparent that the US Navy had lost its acoustic Although this aspect might seem almost trivial, modular
superiority as other nations introduced "quieting" systems are very different from fully integrated systems
technologies into their submarines [2]. Improvement in the wherein changes in software may have major unexpected
Navy's acoustic capability presented an immediate need, consequences in functions that are seemingly unrelated to
unsupported by necessary funding. Not only was there the change.
insufficient funding, there was not time: developmental
programs for warfighting systems stretched over ten or The A-RCI developmental process included a
more years. For submariners, this indeed was a crisis. Build/Test/Build sequence. New system capabilities were
compared to previous system capabilities. A-RCI was able
3.2 The Strategy-MOSA to demonstrate system upgrades through the use of
recorded operational events. In this way, competingNavy evelpers mploed anew aproah in systems could be tested and Judged on their ability to
response to their crisis. Their answer was a modular open process and displa ald rcded dur actual
systems approach. Federated systems were being operana ens.
developed and utilized widely in the private sector, but
such an approach was not well understood for naval
warfighting applications. The A-RCI case study is worth 3 MOSA Business Strategy
relating because of the creative approaches taken by the A-RCI evolutionary strategy was that software
submarine community. The path that A-RCI took was changes would be accomplished annually through a
multifaceted, and the approaches used are instructive for developmental effort called Advanced Processing Builds
others considering MOSA. The effort was truly daunting (APBs), while COTS processors (the hardware) would be
and, in many ways, inspiring. selected bi-annually. This was a highly demanding
acquisition "op tempo," progressing much more rapidly
ModularOpen Systems Approach than usual Defense developmental work.(MOSA)
Vison Principles Renefits MOSA encouraged materiel developers to broaden
communication links with users, contractors, and research
of 3w@1All s !1labsin order to orchestrate both a competitive and
collaborative effort. The competitive "playing field" had to
And #taiaEE be established to attract innovative contractors who might
upwaliq
~~~~~~~~ben w to DoD contracting or might be intimidated by
large prime contractors.
Intellectual Property rights had to be respected, while
BUSINESS at the same time, data and design information needed to be
ndicators shared through mechanisms that were perceived as fair to
competitors. Intellectual Property rights and the protection
of proprietary data were addressed and controlled within
the terms and conditions of the contract. Today, as a resultLegacy systems such as existing submarine sonar of A-RCI and other MOSA efforts, there is helpful
systems circa 1980 were not modular in their design. gudac tha ca beue'ncntutn uhcnrcs
Therefore, the early A-RCI effort required modularizing
the existing sonar systems. It was necessary, then, that the
The A-RCI experience illustrated that open code and controlling key interfaces, and incorporating standards to
the sharing of code enabled collaboration and enhanced the enable interoperability of hardware and software. During
success of open systems design. Prevailing thinking was development, software took shape under the direction of
that intellectual property rights should be made available as the NAVSEA's Advanced Systems Technology Office
part of the price of entering into the competition. In that (ASTO). Software development was accomplished by
way, code and design information could be shared with small innovative contractors, academic research labs, and
other participants to maximize progress [3]. Government labs participating competitively and
collaboratively. But these entities were not, as yet,
3.4 Changing the Culture organized under a prime contractor. Later in the process,
software development was consolidated under the direction
In reaching out to small innovative contractors, large of a software APB integrator. Following a cycle of
contractors, academic labs, and Government activities, it Build/Test/Build, hardware and software systems and
was necessary in the case of A-RCI to change the components were handed-off to the prime system integrator
nature of the "prime contractor." The outcome was that the for assembly of the upgrade package and installation onto
prime contractor was removed from the source selection submarines. All of this occurred at a rapid op tempo. As
process and became the "prime system integrator." The may be envisioned, no single contractor was perfectly
competing solutions were demonstrated using real-world positioned to accomplish SEP from beginning-to-end as a
sensor input, and the best solutions were selected through prime contractor would have done in a traditional
"peer review." development. Beyond the question of who should be
responsible for the Systems Engineering Process, end-to-
Peer review of new developments is recognized end, over the entire developmental cycle, spiral
within the A-RCI/APB program as being one of the development required repetitive developmental cycles
primary reasons for success. Oversight of peer review was further complicating management of the SEP.
uniquely challenging and, at least in the A-RCI/APB
experience, required the PM be technically competent, Spiral Developmenlt
proactive, and disciplined/structured.
The peers included fleet (users) representatives, Lifm
algorithm developers, and evaluators. The program office, - ee IeueItgato ut
together with trusted advisors, selected persons with M ()th
professional reputations for individual excellence, coupled E Govemment
with demonstrated ability to place Navy interests above * le TllC
organizational agendas. An illustrative peer group (cRSaaidustres'l
arrangementisduepictedinFigure2below.|77
3 - ~~~~~~~~~~~Figure3. System Development Model [4]
3 r~~~~~~~~~~orfuture programs, SEP responsibility might residle
with the Government materiel developer (or be separately
LMEX: .1 333 2M-3l33T.tgN- contracted) during testing and peer review before being
: N
~~~~~~~~~~handedoff to a prime system integrator. Needless to say,|
~~~~SEPmanagement is potentially a serious risk area.
__ -3.6 User Participation
A Stakeholder involvement and buy-in were major
<,, ~~~processes [5] . The Submarine Tactical Requirements
+.~~~~~~~~Group (STRG) set A-RCI/APB requirements that initiated
each spiral. Beyond that, user groups provided feedback in
such areas as ease of operation, suitability of configuration,
Figur 2.SnarDvelopent WrkingGrouprequired training, and supportability, for example. Users,
3.5 SsesEgneigof course, were heavily involved in at-sea testing andSystems Engineering
~~~~during submarine retrofit periods; this undoubtedly placed
In the case of A-RCI/APB, a Systems Engineering additional workloads on submarine crews as they had to
Process (SEP) and structure were needed for guiding and determine system upgrade time, training time, and operator
synchronizing the work of the various players, feedback. Yet, in this way, A-RCI user participants served
accommodating a complex testing regimen, carefully as a communication link between developers and fleet
users. The ensuing dialogue contributed substantially to 5 Measurable Effects
sailor acceptance of A-RCI/APB in the fleet.
Technical Performance. Within 18 months, A-RCI
3.7 Communication Forums had provided a 7-fold increase in processing capability.
Participation in essential dialogue involved many Reduced Lifecycle Cost. The Navy is currently
different forums and extended through each developmental validating a historical cost comparison of A-RCI and its
sequence and into the next. The importance of dialogue predecessor system. Preliminary results compiled from 10
between users, materiel developers, and contractors cannot years of data indicate that lifecycle cost has improved by
be overemphasized. nearly 5:1. This comparison includes development,
production, and maintenance costs of A-RCI and its
3.8 Summary predecessor.
In summary, several facets combined to make the A- Cost Avoidance. A-RCI provided many examples of
RCI culture change revolutionary within the DoD. cost savings/cost avoidance.
Changing the nature of the prime contractor to a prime
system integrator, gaining the participation of non- Processing Cost. Processing cost was reduced by a
traditional technical participants, the peer review process factor of 60 that is, 1/60 the cost of the specially
which leveled the competitive playing field, the op tempo developed processors used previously [6].
of the spirals, the intimate user participation, and the
intricate communications structure all profoundly Cost of Obsolescence. Although not quantified, there
facilitated the success of A-RCI/APB. In the aggregate, were two aspects to ARCI's obsolescence costs. First was
this effort took heroic commitment by many different the use of upgrades to avoid paying the high cost required
parties who historically were not "friendly" or cooperative, to provide outdated, scarce components. Second was
How could this cultural change be catalyzed? Part of the harvesting obsolete components that had been removed
answer lay in process and contractual mechanisms. Part from upgraded systems to support older systems in the fleet
also resulted from leadership, which is discussed below. that had not yet transitioned through upgrade.
4 Leadership Cost of Post-deployment Software Support (PDSS).
Once modularized, post-deployment software support wasStrong leadership is essential to proactive change less expensive. That is, software changes made to modular
Several of the A-RCI leadership aspects are as described components were less complex (therefore, less expensive)
below. than changes made to fully integrated systems. The reason
was that the changes must be carefully controlled at keyMandate. Senior leaders provided pressure to change. interfaces, but there was less work required to deal with
Without this "forcing function," it would have been inteces e ry les.
difficult for mid-level leaders/managers to achieve major unexpected secondary effects.
change. There were undoubtedly elements of positive and 5 L
negative motivation; participants both wanted to effect Logistics Impact
change and also had the sense that if they could not get the A-RCI has demonstrated that system upgrades can
job done, they would be replaced. The "mandate" has to include logistics focus. The program's impacts on logistics
be balanced in the case of A-RCI, senior leaders upheld were generally very positive.
such balance extraordinarily well, judging by the outcome.
For example, one A-RCI initiative (and a profound
Mid-level Leadership. The A-RCI appeared to have example of logistics focus) that was unforeseen at the
excellent leaders in various positions, who accepted the outset was the creative employment of spare components in
challenge and effected change. a way that reduced the need for "open cabinet" repairs to
sonar systems while on deployment. Maintenance-Free
In the aggregate, A-RCI worked because Operating Period (MFOP) became feasible because
stakeholders, "formed a community that learned to be commercial processors fit into less space than their
comfortable with change not just technical things or even developmental predecessors. It was found that sonar
business processes" [5]. This was a reflection of a new system spare components could be installed and fully
leadership vision that was widely embraced by ARCI powered within electronics cabinets, enabling them to be
participants. immediately available in the event of a primary system
malfunction.
Additionally, as previously explained, modularization as an example of the flexibility to act proactively. In the
impacts Lifecycle Cost (LCC) through less expensive future, that same flexibility may be useful in response to
replacement of obsolete hardware and software. Likewise, component obsolescence.
PDSS is simplified because software is re-used where
possible. A-RCI also has illustrated that much of the 5.4 Comparison of Legacy vs. New Systems
necessary maintenance can be shifted to contractor logistics
support (CLS); further, demonstration has shown that some Legacy warfighting systems that have converted to
software defects can be addressed remotely by CLS. MOSA are in better competitive position for upgrade
funding than those unable to become modularized.
Yet another logistical aspect has been highlighted by
this research: the A-RCI experience has shown that the 5.5 Financial Management
character of sonar training has changed. It has been
refocused to address performance weaknesses. Some A-RCI funding streams have changed from the widely
maintenance training has been reduced or eliminated as the recognized pattern of RDT&E, followed by Production,
result of MFOP, providing the potential for increased followed by Operations & Support. As spiral development
employment training. Upgraded training packages still are continues, there is need for continued RDT&E funding,
necessary, of course, to achieve full benefit of the system albeit at a reduced level, in order to take advantage of
modifications [7]. MOSA.
Sometimes offered as a criticism of A-RCI is the fact 5.6 Summary
that operators and maintenance technicians needed frequent Acoustic Rapid COTS Insertion/Advanced Processing
updates and, possibly, needed to be familiar with multiple Build (A-RCI/APB) shows the promise of a modular opengenerations of sonar systems. However, as cumbersome as
this seems, it may have been no more difficult than in the sts aprah (MOSA). a-C was a leader, finding
ps.Nevertheless, there seems little question that the rapid iswywe e ue ndgieie eeaalbepast. . Today, there is a body of information showing the benefits
op tempo of A-RCI evolutions did present training
of A-RCI. Rules and guidelines have emerged to help
challenges for operators and maintainers, guide other programs through MOSA; many of those
guidelines are the result of the A-RCI experience. Other
5.2 Other Ramifications programs' successes, such as Virginia Class Non-
Portability and Software Re-use. The portability of Propulsion Electronic systems (NPES) and E-2 Hawkeye
modular software to other systems and other platforms aircraft upgrade, suggest that A-RCI was not simply a one-
offers additional opportunity for cost savings or cost time success. In the aggregate, these several successful
avoidance. programs are an indication that other acquisition programs
might use MOSA with similar benefits. The A-RCI
Scalability. One of the questions resulting from A- experience indicates that some Acquisition processes need
RCI is whether the modular open systems approach is to be retooled to interface with and reap the advantages of
applicable in larger, more complicated applications. rapid spiral development.
Implementation. Though there isn't room to 6 Conclusions
completely explore current and future implementation in
this discussion, two warfighting systems, Virginia Class 6.1 A-RCI/APB has successfully applied
Submarine Non-propulsion Electronic Systems (NPES) MOSA, deriving major performance and
and E-2 Hawkeye Electronic Surveillance Aircraft have . .
successfully implemented MOSA. Two of DoD's most logistcs improvements.
challenging warfighting systems, the Army's Future The A-RCI program drastically changed its technical
Combat Systems (FCS) and National Missile Defense, and business practices embracing business and technical
seem to be good candidates for MOSA. principles and disciplined processes that currently comprise
the Modular Open Systems Approach. The results were a
5.3 Treatment of Obsolescence series of substantial technical improvements, reduced
cycle-times, transition to COTS processors, and software
From a logistics perspective, one of the major benefits sharing across weapon platforms.
Of open systems is the freedom to exercise the "plug and
play" feature at such time as a module becomes obsolete
and is no longer able to be supported. Plug and Play
replacement is useful because all of our warfighting
systems experience sustainment issues as soon as
production has been completed. A- RCI/APB is now seen
6.2 A-RCI demonstrated significant Total References
Ownership Cost or system Lifecycle Cost [1] Open systems Joint Task Force,
benefits. http://www.acq.osd.mil/osjtf/, Department of Defense,
Accessed 28 October 2006.
The Navy is currently validating a historical cost
comparison of A-RCI and its predecessor system. [2] Richard Scott, "Open for Business: a New Model for
Preliminary results compiled from 10 years of data on both Submarine Sonar," Jane's Navy Interational, 1 March
A-RCI and its predecessor indicate that lifecycle cost has 2006.
improved by nearly 5:1.
[3] Program Executive Officer, Integrated Warfare
6.3 The A-RCI/APB example shows that Systems 7, Naval Open Architecture Contract Guidebook,
MOSA can be applied to a legacy system. Version 1, author, Washington, DC, 7 July 2006.
A-RCI/APB was modularized by first separating [4] C. E. Barron, "Naval Open Architecture Acquisition
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feasibility assessment of open-system solutions-an Draft, p.15, August 2006.
essential business and technical consideration when
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6.4 A-RCI/APB demonstrates that modular
upgrades can be accomplished very [6] William M. Johnson, "The A-RCI Process-
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contrast to traditional systems
development. [7] Gibson Kerr, "COTS: We Can't Afford to Do It Any
Other Way," US Naval Institute, Proceedings, Vol.
A-RCI/APB was able to produce an Advanced 132/10/1, No. 244, p. 69, October 2006.
Processing Build annually and upgrade COTS processing
hardware every two years. Implementations in the
submarine fleets resulted in each submarine obtaining
upgraded software at about two-year intervals and new
COTS processors at approximately four-year intervals.
6.5 Funding implications of A-RCI need to
be studied and understood.
Traditional funding profiles do not support the A-RCI
example. Traditional funding entails three overlapping
funding profiles of increasing size: RDT&E, Procurement,
and the O&S accounts (primarily O&M and military
personnel). Annual increments of spiral development
require continuous streams of RDT&E, Procurement, and
the O&S accounts smaller, more flat annual amounts,
continuously, as long as the annual spirals continue.
This is an abbreviated version of the complete research
report. The complete research report may be accessed
from the Acquisition Research Program website
www.acgusiinresearchog
